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I. Introduction
Guardianship is the greatest restriction on an individual’s rights outside of
incarceration or involuntary commitment.1 Individuals under a guardianship are
* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming College of Law, 2020. I would like to thank
Professor Jacquelyn Bridgeman for her feedback and suggestions. Thank you to the Editorial Board
of the Wyoming Law Review for their help throughout the writing process. I especially want to
thank Julianne Gern for introducing me to this topic and for her help. Finally, thank you to Tyler
Schlueter and my family for their support and encouragement.
See A. Frank Johns, Ten Years After: Where Is the Constitutional Crisis with Procedural Safeguards
and Due Process in Guardianship Adjudication?, 7 Elder L.J. 33, 37 (1999) (“[G]uardianship
1
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deprived of many rights, such as the right to enter into contracts, make their
own decisions about where to live, and decide when and how to start a family.2
The purpose of a guardianship is to help incompetent individuals who cannot
help themselves—including the elderly and some individuals with physical
disabilities or mental illnesses.3 Wyoming allows for individuals to be placed
into a guardianship if the petitioner proves by a simple preponderance of the
evidence that a guardianship is necessary and that the individual is incompetent.4
Wyoming is the only state using a preponderance of the evidence standard in
guardianship proceedings.5 Unfortunately, this low standard of proof required for
guardianships results in the implementation of guardianships for individuals who
do not need such intrusive assistance.6 The standard of proof does not provide
adequate protection to individuals who are at risk of losing fundamental rights
and, therefore, the standard is unconstitutional.7 Since the Wyoming guardianship
statute is unconstitutional in its entirety, a higher degree of protection is required.8
Part II of this Comment begins with an overview of guardianship proceedings
and discusses Wyoming’s guardianship statute, Wyoming Statute § 3-2-104.9
Then, Part III illustrates why Wyoming Statute § 3-2-104 is unconstitutional on

is a legal process or arrangement under which one person (a guardian) is granted the authority,
legal right, and duty to care for another person (the ward) and his or her property.” (quoting
Guardianship, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990))); Erica Wood et al., ABA Comm’n on
Law and Aging with the Virginia Tech Ctr. for Gerontology, Restoration of Rights in Adult
Guardianship: Research and Recommendations 6 (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/restoration%20report.authcheckdam.pdf. (“[G]uardianship
is one of society’s most drastic interventions in which fundamental rights are transferred to a
surrogate, leaving an individual without choice and self-determination.”). See also generally Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 3-2-201 (2019).
2
Susan G. Haines & John J. Campbell, Defects, Due Process, and Protective Proceedings, 2
Elder’s Advisor 13, 15–16 (2000) (“The constitutionally protected individual interests implicated
in a guardianship proceeding include the right to choose where to live and with whom to associate,
the right to make medical decisions regarding one’s body, the right to marry and to freely associate,
the right to travel or pursue in privacy the activities of daily living, and the right to be free from
unwanted constraints or incarceration.”).
3
Jenica Cassidy, State Statutory Authority for Restoration of Rights in Termination of Adult
Guardianship, 24 Bifocal 123, 123 (2018); see also Haines & Campbell, supra note 2, at 13, 15–16.
4

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-104.

Am. Bar Ass’n, Conduct and Findings of Guardianship Proceedings Statutory Revisions as of
August 7, 2018, ABA Comm’n on L. & Aging 14 (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/chartconduct.pdf.
5

See infra notes 76 –244 and accompanying text. An unknown number of individuals are
placed in guardianships who never needed it or remain in a guardianship past the point of need.
Wood et al., supra note 1, at 6. Additional evidence obtained after proceedings may show the
guardianship was unnecessary. Id. at 20.
6

7

See infra notes 76–244 and accompanying text.

8

See infra notes 245–50 and accompanying text.

9

See infra notes 12–75 and accompanying text.
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procedural due process grounds under Mathews v. Eldridge.10 Accordingly, Part III
proposes that the evidentiary standard of “clear and convincing evidence” should
replace the “preponderance of the evidence” standard currently required by statute
in Wyoming.11

II. Background
Guardianship provides the state with a mechanism to protect those who
can no longer care for themselves; this concept is derived from the parens patriae
doctrine.12 The United States first adopted guardianship proceedings from English
common law.13 In England, the parens patriae doctrine allowed the monarch to
assert paternalistic control over orphans and incompetent persons.14 The purpose
of the doctrine was to benefit those who could not care for themselves.15 To
this day, state law controls guardianship proceedings.16 Guardianships may be
put in place for two different types of people: minors and those who are found
to be incompetent.17 This Comment will focus on those who are appointed
guardians based on incompetence.18 With regard to incompetent individuals,
the justification for the parens patriae doctrine is the protection of the individual’s
best interests.19
In a guardianship proceeding, the court grants one individual (the guardian)
authority to act in the best interest of another individual who can no longer
care for herself (the ward).20 The process of appointing a guardian begins when
an individual petitions the court; this person, called the petitioner, is usually
the individual who would like to be appointed as the guardian.21 The person
who will potentially be placed under guardianship is called the proposed ward.22

10

See infra notes 76 –226 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 227–37 and accompanying text.

Cassidy, supra note 3, at 123; see also Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 Tul. L.
Rev. 1847, 1850 (2000).
12

13

Ratliff, supra note 12, at 1850.

Nicole M. Arsenault, Start with a Presumption She Doesn’t Want to Be Dead: Fatal Flaws in
Guardianships of Individuals with Intellectual Disability, 35 L. & Ineq. 23, 26 (2017); see also Ratliff,
supra note 12, at 1850.
14

15
Cassidy, supra note 3, at 123; Arsenault, supra note 14, at 26; Haines & Campbell, supra
note 2, at 13.
16

Arsenault, supra note 14, at 32.

17

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-101 (2019).

18

See infra notes 76–244 and accompanying text.

19

Haines & Campbell, supra note 2, at 16.

20

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-104, -201.

21

Id. § 3-2-101.

22

Id.
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When someone other than the proposed ward petitions the court, it is termed
an involuntary petition.23 The proposed ward can also voluntarily petition the
court for a guardianship to be placed over herself.24 In either situation, Wyoming
courts only appoint a guardian if the petitioner proves by a preponderance
of the evidence that the proposed ward is incompetent and that the appointment
is necessary.25
First, the petitioner must prove the proposed ward is incompetent.26
Incompetency may result from a number of causes, including developmental
disabilities, serious mental illnesses, Alzheimer’s, dementia, genetic conditions,
brain injuries, or substance abuse disorders.27 Incompetence can also arise from
something as simple as advanced age.28 The petitioner can prove the proposed
ward is incompetent through medical records, social service records, and testimony
from family, friends, caregivers, or educators.29
Second, the court will only appoint a guardian if the petitioner also proves
by a preponderance of the evidence that the appointment is necessary.30 Under
this standard of proof, the petitioner must only prove that the guardianship is
more necessary than not.31 In In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of Parkhurst,
the Wyoming Supreme Court defined necessity as “a condition arising out of
circumstances that compels to a certain course of action.”32 The court further
interpreted this definition to require a case-by-case consideration of various

23
McNeel v. McNeel (In re McNeel), 2005 WY 36, ¶ 23–24, 109 P.3d 510, 518 (2005).
There are even instances when a lawyer may be a petitioner. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct
1.14(b) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2018) (“When a lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished
capacity . . . the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including . . . in appropriate
cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator, or guardian.”). The lawyer is
also authorized to provide any information necessary about the client, which is usually prohibited
by Model Rule 1.6(a). Id. at 1.14(c).
24

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-105.

25

Id. § 3-2-104.

26

Id.

Id. § 3-1-101(ix). In Wyoming, an “incompetent person means an individual who, for
reasons other than being a minor, is unable unassisted to properly manage and take care of himself
or his property as a result of the medical conditions of advanced age, physical disability, disease,
the use of alcohol or controlled substances, mental illness, mental deficiency or intellectual
disability.” Id.
27

28

Id.

29

A. Kimberly Dalton et al., Advising the Elderly Client § 34:10 (2018).

30

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-104.

31

J.J.F. v. State, 2006 WY 41, ¶ 9, 132 P.3d 170, 174 (2006).

Boykin v. Parkhurst (In re Parkhurst), 2010 WY 155, ¶ 22, 243 P.3d 961, 968 (2010)
(citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1510–11 (1986)).
32
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factors.33 For example, in In re Guardianship of Sands, the petitioner established
necessity by showing the individual lived in an unsanitary environment, misused
financial funds, overdosed on his medication, and received a diagnosis of both
dementia and Asperger’s.34
If the petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the
guardianship is necessary and that the proposed ward is incompetent, the court
will appoint a guardian.35 Under Wyoming law, “guardian” means a person the
court appoints to exercise certain powers on behalf of an incompetent person.36
The guardian has the power to make decisions and care for the ward.37 When
the court appoints a guardian, the law requires the guardianship terms to be
minimally restrictive, allowing the ward to keep as much autonomy as practical in
any given situation.38
A guardian is in a fiduciary position, rooted in trust, wherein she is required
to act in the best interests of the ward.39 A fiduciary is an individual “who is
required to act for the benefit of another person on all matters within the scope
of their relationship . . . one who owes to another the duties of good faith, trust,
confidence, and candor.”40 The guardian, as a fiduciary, has two duties: a duty of
loyalty and a duty of care.41 The duty of loyalty requires the guardian to put the
interests of the ward first, and to refrain from acting for personal benefit.42 The
duty of care requires the guardian to “act as an ordinary prudent person would act
in the management of his or her own affairs.”43 Ultimately, the guardian must act
as a prudent person would, in the best interest of the ward.44

33
Id. at ¶ 23, 243 P.3d at 968 (“[N]o general rule exists as to the conditions warranting
the appointment of a guardian for an incompetent person, due to the variances in the statutes
among the jurisdictions and because the necessity for a guardian generally is determined on the
circumstances of the particular case.” (quoting 39 Am. Jur. 2d Guardian and Ward § 24 (2008))).
Some of the factors weighed for necessity include whether an individual is able to feed, dress, and
provide personal hygiene for themselves. Id. ¶ 28, 243 P.3d at 970.
34

Sands v. Brown (In re Sands), 2013 WY 60, ¶ 17, 19–25, 301 P.3d 128, 132–34 (2013).

35

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-104.

36

Id. § 3-1-101(v).

37

See id. § 3-2-201; infra notes 119–35 and accompanying text.

38

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-1-206(a)(i), 3-2-104.

39

John F. Mariani et al., Understanding Fiduciary Duty, 84 Fla. B.J. 20, 22 (2010).

40

Fiduciary Duty, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th Pocket ed. 2011).

41

Mariani et al., supra note 39, at 22.

Id. (“[The duty of loyalty] gives rise to more specific duties, such as the prohibition against
self-dealing, conflicts of interest, and the duty to disclose material facts.”).
42

43
Id. (“If the [guardian] has special skills, or becomes a fiduciary on the basis of representations
of special skills or expertise, the fiduciary is under a duty to use those skills.”).
44

See supra notes 39– 43 and accompanying text.
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There are many advantages to having the court appoint a guardian.45 For
individuals who require assistance in decision-making and overall personal wellbeing, guardianship may be the ward’s only option for protection against harm
and exploitation.46 Appointing guardians to incompetent individuals provides
consistency and security by allowing wards to have one individual or entity
make essential decisions for them.47 A guardian can diminish the conflict between
family members by making decisions such as where the ward will live or who
will take care of the ward.48 Guardians also have access to third-party profes
sionals who can evaluate the ward’s personal or financial affairs.49 For example,
the guardian can place the ward in an individual care facility, develop an
individualized care plan, and monitor her daily activity logs and medical records
to ensure the care plan is being met.50 The guardian can also retain counsel for
the ward in situations where the ward has been abused financially or denied
appropriate health care.51 Placing an incompetent individual under a guardianship
may have a positive impact on the ward’s life.52
Although there are many advantages to court-appointed guardians, there are
also several disadvantages.53 Guardianships cost the ward a substantial amount of
money and time; the ward incurs all of the court fees and legal expenses.54 If the
proposed ward has a substantial estate, the proceeding is often highly contested,
causing the proposed ward to pay even more.55 Every part of the guardianship
proceeding exposes intimate details of the ward’s life, including finances, social
activities, medical records, and living situations.56 Although guardianship may
45

See infra notes 46–52 and accompanying text.

46

Dalton et al., supra note 29, at § 34:10.

47

Id.

48

Id.

Id. (“[The guardian] can take steps to enhance the ward’s quality of life, as by hiring
companions to visit the ward, taking him on excursions or vacations, and otherwise providing
contact with the community.”).
49

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

See supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text.

53

See infra notes 54–62 and accompanying text.

Dalton et al., supra note 29, § 34:9 (“Even the most pro forma, efficient, and nonadversarial guardianship or conservatorship proceeding may take 20 to 30 days . . . . The petitioner’s
expenses to adjudicate the guardianship are usually borne by the ward’s estate . . . such as attorney’s
fees, travel expenses, meals, expert witnesses [on both sides]. . . . Additionally, the ward generally
bears the expenses associated with retaining a guardian ad litem [and] additional counsel other than
the guardian ad litem . . . .”).
54

Dalton et al., supra note 29, § 34:9 (“If the [proposed ward’s] estate is substantial, the
expenses . . . may also include fees for the testimony of accountants, financial planners, trust officers,
bank officers, and any other expert witnesses with information regarding the property of the alleged
incompetent adult . . . adding exponentially to its costs.”).
55

56

Id.
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resolve certain family conflicts, they also have the potential to create family
disputes.57 The guardian has the power to limit the information the family of the
ward receives.58 Consequently, the family may not know of the decisions made
by the guardian on the ward’s behalf, such as where the ward is living (if the
guardian decides it is in the best interest for the ward to move) or if the ward is
hospitalized.59 The guardian has the discretion to decide how much interaction
and communication family members or friends can have with the ward.60 By far,
the biggest disadvantage to a guardianship is the ward’s loss of fundamental rights
when she is appointed a guardian.61 Because of these many disadvantages, an
erroneous appointment of a guardianship has a substantial negative impact on a
competent individual’s life.62
If and when the ward’s condition improves, it is very difficult for a ward
to terminate the guardianship and restore her rights.63 If the court determines
the guardianship is no longer in the best interests of the ward and that the ward
is competent and able to manage her personal and financial affairs, the court
can terminate the guardianship and restore the individual’s rights.64 The ward
may regain capacity in cases where the incapacity was only “temporary or the
individual has responded to treatment” for the incapacity.65 Under Wyoming law,
only the ward may petition for termination and restoration of her rights.66 A
majority of the states allow for the ward or any interested party to petition for
termination.67 Wyoming is again an anomaly with regard to the timing of the
57

Id.

58

Id.

Id.; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-201(a)(i) (2019) (“The guardian shall . . . [d]etermine and
facilitate the least restrictive and most appropriate and available residence for the ward . . . .”).
59

60

Dalton et al., supra note 29, § 34:9.

61

See infra notes 124–38 and accompanying text.

62

See supra notes 53– 61 and accompanying text.

63

See infra notes 64–70 and accompanying text.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-3-1101 (“A guardianship shall cease, and a conservatorship shall
terminate, upon the occurrence of any of the following circumstances: (i) If upon attaining the
age of majority when the ward is a minor who has not been adjudged an incompetent person or a
mentally incompetent person; (ii) The death of the ward, subject to W.S. 3-2-109(a)(iii) and 3-2201(a)(x); (iii) A determination by the court that the ward is competent and capable of managing
his property and affairs, and that the continuance of the guardianship or conservatorship is not in
his best interest; (iv) A determination by the court that the guardian or conservator is not acting in
the best interest of the ward. In such case, the court shall appoint another guardian or conservator;
(v) Upon determination by the court that the conservatorship or guardianship is no longer necessary
for any other reason.”).
64

Jenica Cassidy, Restoration of Rights in the Termination of Adult Guardianship, 3 Elder
L.J. 83, 84 (2015) (citing Mass. Guardianship Assoc., Handbook for Massachusetts Guardians
11 (2010)).
65

66

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-3-1105(a); Cassidy, supra note 3, at 124.

67

Cassidy, supra note 3, at 124.
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petition: wards placed in guardianships are unable to petition for termination
until six months have passed since the appointment.68 Forty-six states do not
place limitations on the time in which requests for restoration may be filed.69
Altogether, these limitations engender substantial impediments on the ward’s
ability to terminate an erroneous guardianship.70

A. Wyoming Statute § 3-2-104
In Wyoming, the court appoints guardians under Wyoming Statute § 3-2104, which provides that “[t]he court may appoint a guardian if the allegations
of the petition as to the status of the proposed ward and the necessity for the
appointment of a guardian are proved by a preponderance of the evidence.”71
This statute thereby sets the evidentiary standard for the process that empowers
the court to take away fundamental rights from the proposed ward.72
Preponderance of the evidence is the lowest standard of proof, with clear and
convincing evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt requiring much higher
thresholds.73 The Wyoming Supreme Court defines preponderance of the
evidence as “proof which leads the trier of fact to find that the existence of the
contested fact is more probable than its non-existence.”74 Requiring proof only by
a preponderance of the evidence in guardianship proceedings violates procedural
due process because the standard does not provide adequate protection to
individuals whose fundamental rights are at stake in the proceeding.75

III. Analysis
A. Due Process
The United States Constitution discusses the right to due process twice.76
Both the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments provide that the government shall
not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”77
For a due process claim to arise, the deprivation of life, liberty, or property must

68

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-3-1105(a); Cassidy, supra note 3, at 126.

69

Cassidy, supra note 3, at 126.

70

See supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text.

71

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-104.

72

See infra notes 124–38 and accompanying text.

73

J.J.F. v. State, 2006 WY 41, ¶ 24, 132 P.3d 170, 178 (2006).

74

Id. at ¶ 9, 132 P.3d at 174.

75

See infra notes 76 –244 and accompanying text.

76

U.S. Const. amend. V, § X; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § X.

77

U.S. Const. amend. V, § X; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § X.
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occur due to a violation by the government.78 The Fourteenth Amendment applies
when there is state action.79 Since the State of Wyoming defines guardianship
proceedings, and because state courts are substantially involved in guardianship
appointments, guardianship proceedings constitute state action.80 Therefore, this
Comment focuses on a Fourteenth Amendment analysis.81
Due process comes in two forms: substantive and procedural due process.82
Substantive due process requires the government to prove that the deprivation
of the individual’s life, liberty, or property was justified.83 Courts apply varying
levels of scrutiny to determine if there is justification for the deprivation.84
Procedural due process requires the government to provide certain procedures
before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.85 This requirement ensures
consistency in governmental proceedings.86 At the core of procedural due process
is fundamental fairness.87 Procedural due process requires “adequate notice and
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”88
The “meaningful manner” requirement considers procedures such as time and
the standards of proof.89 The requirement has also been found to include the
“concept of reasonableness.”90 Thus, the standard of proof must be reasonable

78

See Rob B. Keiter, The Wyoming State Constitution 59– 60 (2d. ed. 2017).

Hanesworth v. Johnke, 783 P.2d 173, 176 (Wyo. 1989); Garnett v. Brock, 2 P.3d 558, 563
(Wyo. 2000) (“The Fourteenth Amendment insures that a state may not ‘deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.’”).
79

80
Arsenault, supra note 14, at 32 (“There is no national procedure for appointment of a
guardian; the practice belongs to the individual states to define.”); In re Guardianship of Hilton’s
Estate, 265 P.2d 747, 748 (Wyo. 1954); Hanesworth, 783 P.2d at 176 (“We hold that the
involvement of the district court in the probate proceedings is so pervasive and substantial that it
must be considered such state action as to invoke the due process clause of the United States and
Wyoming Constitutions.”).
81

See infra notes 94 –113 and accompanying text.

82

Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law Principles and Policies 570 (5th ed. 2015).

83

Keiter, supra note 78, at 59– 60.

84

Id.

Id. at 59 (“Although the language in this provision parallels the federal due process clause,
the Wyoming Supreme Court has held that it provides more protection for individuals than does its
federal counterpart.”).
85

86

Id. at 60.

87

Id. at 61 (citing Munoz v. Maschner, 590 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Wyo. 1979)).

Id. (citing ELA v. AAB, 2016 WY 98, 382 P.3d 45 (2016); Patterson v. State. 2012 WY
90, 279 P.3d 535 (Wyo. 2012); DH v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs. (In re “H” Children), 2003
WY 155, 79 P.3d 997 (2003); Robbins v. S. Cheyenne Water & Sewage Dist., 792 P.2d 1380
(Wyo. 1990)).
88

89

ELA, ¶ 21, 382 P.3d at 50; J.J.F. v. State, 2006 WY 41, ¶ 13, 132 P.3d 170, 175 (2006).

J.J.F., ¶ 13, 132 P.3d at 174 –75 (citing Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 838 A.2d 710, 714
(Penn. 2003)).
90
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for the type of proceeding.91 For example, in criminal law, due to the severity
of the deprivation, the government must prove the underlying charge beyond a
reasonable doubt.92 The standard of proof employed in guardianship proceedings
implicates procedural due process concerns because the proceedings require the
lowest standard of proof, which may not be reasonable due to the substantial loss
the ward faces.93

1. Procedural Due Process
Wyoming uses a two-part test to determine whether the government has
violated procedural due process.94 The first prong analyzes whether there is a
deprivation.95 Procedural due process rights “are meant to protect persons not
from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life,
liberty, or property.”96 Guardianship implicates a deprivation of liberty and
property interests and, due to the difficulties in terminating guardianships, these
deprivations are effectively permanent.97
In Board of Regents v. Roth, the United States Supreme Court defined
deprivation of liberty as a loss of a right provided explicitly or implicitly from
the constitution or a statute.98 Individual rights can be found in both the
Declaration of Independence and the Wyoming Constitution.99 Guardianships
deprive wards of their fundamental rights, signifying a deprivation of liberty.100 For
example, guardianships deprive wards of their right to travel, to vote, to maintain

91

Id.

92

Maldonado, 838 A.2d at 718.

93

See infra notes 94 –113 and accompanying text.

Garnett v. Brock, 2 P.3d 558, 563 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Gardetto v. Mason, 854 F. Supp.
1520, 1533–34 (D. Wyo. 1994)).
94

95

Id. (quoting Gardetto, 854 F. Supp. at 1533–34).

96

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).

97

See supra notes 63–70 and accompanying text; infra notes 98–109 and accompanying text.

Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (internal cites omitted) (“In a
Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of ‘liberty’ must be broad
indeed.”); Chemerinsky, supra note 82, at 590.
98

The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1976) (“We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”); Wyo.
Const. art. I, §§ 2, 6, 36 (amended 1996) (“In their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness, all members of the human race are equal. . . . No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law. . . . The enumeration in this constitution, of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny, impair, or disparage others retained by the people.”).
99

Roth, 408 U.S. at 572; U.S. Const. amend. XIV; see also infra notes 124–38 and
accompanying text.
100
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privacy, and to marry—all major losses.101 When a guardianship proceeding
deprives a ward of these fundamental rights, the proceeding deprives the ward of
liberty interests.102
A guardianship may also deprive a ward of her property rights.103 In Roth,
the Supreme Court defined property as a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to a
property interest.104 A court will generally find that an individual has entitlement
to a property interest if there is a “reasonable expectation to continued receipt of
a benefit.”105 Guardianships may limit or diminish a ward’s access to their own
property.106 For example, in In re Guardianship of Hilton’s Estate, the guardian
sold real and personal property belonging to the ward to raise funds for the
ward’s maintenance, medical care, and hospitalization.107 The ward contested the
sale of her property, but the court confirmed the sale.108 In that case, the guardian
deprived the ward of her “legitimate claim of entitlement” to her real and personal
property—signifying a deprivation of a property interest.109
The first prong of the of the due process violation test requires there to
be a deprivation of a protected interest.110 By depriving wards of both liberty
and property interests, guardianship proceedings meet the first prong of the
test.111 However, in Wyoming, establishing a deprivation is only the first part of
a two-part test by which a court decides whether there has been a due process
violation.112 The second prong analyzes whether the procedures were sufficient,
and this analysis is guided by the balancing test set forth in the seminal case of
Mathews v. Eldridge.113

101

See infra notes 124–38 and accompanying text; Haines & Campbell, supra note 2, at 15.

102

See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.

103

See infra notes 104– 09 and accompanying text.

104

Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Chemerinsky, supra note 82, at 584.

105

See Chemerinsky, supra note 82, at 585.

106

See infra notes 107– 09 and accompanying text.

In re Guardianship of Hilton’s Estate, 265 P.2d 747, 748 (Wyo. 1954). The real property
in this case was the ward’s current home and the place she resided for many years. Id. The personal
property included 180 head of cattle, 300 sheep, and some farm equipment. Id.
107

108

Id.

109

See supra notes 104 – 08 and accompanying text.

Garnett v. Brock, 2 P.3d 558, 563 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Gardetto v. Mason, 854 F. Supp.
1520, 1533 –34 (D. Wyo. 1994)).
110

111

See supra notes 94–109 and accompanying text.

112

Garnett, 2 P.3d at 563 (quoting Gardetto, 854 F. Supp. at 1533–34).

113

Id.
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B. Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test
In Eldridge, the Government requested additional proof of George
Eldridge’s continued disability to prevent termination of his social security
disability benefits on the grounds that the government believed his disability
had ceased.114 Eldridge complied with the Government’s requests; however, the
Government determined its original finding that the disability had ceased was
correct, and terminated Eldridge’s benefits.115 Eldridge filed suit claiming the
termination procedures were unconstitutional because the government did not
provide him with an evidentiary hearing before terminating his benefits.116 The
district court found in favor of Eldridge, and the court of appeals affirmed.117 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and developed a three-part balancing test to
determine whether a procedure satisfies constitutional due process requirements,
under which a court must weigh the following interests:
first the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.118
Although Eldridge involved an administrative hearing, the Court noted in
Parham v. J.R. that the balancing test may also be used as a “general approach
for testing challenged state procedures under a due process claim.”119 The
Wyoming Supreme Court has previously employed this test to determine whether
constitutionally-required burdens of proof have been met.120 Under the balancing
114

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 320 (1976).

115

Id. at 324.

116

Id. at 324–25.

117

Id. at 325–26.

118

Id. at 335.

119

Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979).

J.J.F. v. State, 2006 WY 41, ¶ 10, 132 P.3d 170, 174 (2006). The factors weighed include:
“(1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of the erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used; (3) the probable value of any alternative procedures; and
(4) the government’s interest.” Id. This analysis will include the probable value of any alternative
procedures as a subsection of the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used factor. See id. See also Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 941 (Wyo. 2000) (holding that
a disciplinary proceeding involving a professional license must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence); J.J.F., ¶ 34, 132 P.3d at 181 (holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard
adequately protected sex offenders’ rights); State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Robbins, 2011 WY 23,
¶ 18, 246 P.3d 864, 867 (2011) (holding that the disqualification of a commercial driver’s license
did not require proof by clear and convincing evidence).
120
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test outlined in Eldridge, the burden of proof afforded for appointment of a
guardian under Wyoming Statute § 3-2-104 is unconstitutional.121

1. The Private Interest Affected by the Official Action
Under Eldridge, the first step is to consider the importance of the interest to
the individual.122 With guardianship comes harsh consequences: “[it] is the only
proceeding in American courts in which adults can be permanently deprived of
rights solely in order to protect their well-being when they are unable to care
for themselves.”123 The private interests at stake during guardianship proceedings
include property interests, liberty interests, and other fundamental rights.124
Fundamental rights are those rights identified in the Constitution that are a
significant component of liberty and require a higher degree of protection from
governmental intrusion.125 As noted earlier, guardianships deprive individuals of
many rights, including the right to work in certain professions, raise children,
consent to medical treatment, make decisions about property, vote, make end-oflife decisions, marry, possess firearms, contract, and file lawsuits.126 Since many
of these rights are fundamental, courts should require more procedural safeguards before an individual will be deprived of them.127
The specific fundamental rights implicated by Wyoming’s guardianship
proceedings include the right to marry, the right to vote, the right to privacy,
and the right to travel.128 In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court found that
“marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very
existence and survival.”129 Wyoming Statute § 3-2-201(vi) states that a guardian
121

See infra notes 245–52 and accompanying text.

122

Chemerinsky, supra note 82, at 606.

123

Cassidy, supra note 3, at 123.

124

See supra notes 94–113 and accompanying text; infra notes 128–37 and accompanying text.

Fundamental Right, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 1; Kingston v. Honeycut (In re
Honeycut), 908 P.2d 976, 979 (Wyo. 1995) (“A fundamental right is a right which is guaranteed
explicitly or implicitly by the constitution.” (citing Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 53–54
(Wyo. 1992))).
125

126
Haines & Campbell, supra note 2, at 15–16.; Jennifer L. Wright, Guardianship for
Your Own Good: Improving the Well-Being of Respondents and Wards in the USA, 33 Int’l J.L. &
Psychiatry 350, 351 (2010); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-202 (2019) (“Upon order of the court, after
receiving notice and hearing and appointment of a guardian ad litem, the guardian may: . . . consent
to the following treatments for the ward: . . . sterilization [and] other long-term or permanent
contraception . . . relinquish the ward’s minor children for adoption . . . .”). See supra notes 94–113
and accompanying text; see infra notes 187–94 and accompanying text.
127

See Chemerinsky, supra note 82, at 606–07, 826; infra notes 128–37 and accompany-

ing text.
128

See infra notes 129–34 and accompanying text.

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942)).
129

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2019

13

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 19 [2019], No. 2, Art. 5

404

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 19

may “consent to the marriage . . . of the ward;” thus guardianships may deprive
an individual of her fundamental right to marriage.130 The Supreme Court also
found the right to vote to be a fundamental right.131 In Wyoming, when the
court finds a person mentally incompetent and appoints a guardian, she is also
prohibited from voting, therefore depriving the ward of her fundamental right to
vote.132 Although the Constitution does not specifically identify a right to privacy,
the Supreme Court has held that a “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.”133 Areas
included in this zone of privacy are marriage, procreation, contraception, and
family relationships.134 Guardianship affects many of these areas: the guardian
may be required to consent to the marriage of the ward, to authorize or withhold
authorization for medical treatment (including contraceptive care), and to
facilitate social activities, which can include family members—all of which can
deprive the ward of her right to privacy.135 Similarly, the Court has long recog
nized the right to travel as being fundamental.136 A guardian’s implicit control
over the ward’s movements and location undoubtedly implicate this fundamental
right.137 Accordingly, the first prong of the Eldridge test reveals that the private
130
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-201(vi) (2019) (implying that when a guardian is granted this
power by the court, the ward must have the guardian’s permission in order to marry).
131
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632–34 (1969).
132
Wyo. Const. art. VI, § 6 (amended 1996) (“All persons adjudicated to be mentally
incompetent or persons convicted of felonies, unless restored to civil rights, are excluded from the
elective franchise.”); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-104 (2019). In order for a guardian to be appointed,
the petitioner is required prove the status of the ward. Id. In the petition, the petitioner must state
the status of the ward as “a minor, an incompetent person or a mentally incompetent person.” Id.
§ 3-2-101(ii). In Wyoming, a “‘mentally incompetent person’ means an individual who is unable
unassisted to properly manage and take care of himself or his property as the result of mental illness,
mental deficiency, or intellectual disability . . . .” Id. § 3-1-101(xii).
133

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).

Id. at 152–53 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942) (procreation); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, at
453–54 (1972) (White, J., concurring in result) (contraception); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944) (family relationships)).
134

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-2-201(vi), -202(ii); Dalton et al., supra note 29, § 34:9 (“A
family member’s or friend’s access to and involvement with the ward is available at the guardian’s
discretion . . . .”).
135

136
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31 (1969) (“‘The constitutional right to travel
from one State to another occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is
a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized . . . freedom to travel throughout
the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution.’” (quoting
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757–58 (1966))).

Haines & Campbell, supra note 2, at 15; Wood et al., supra note 1, at 20 (citing Fred
Bayles, Guardianship of the Elderly: An Ailing System Part II: Many Elderly Never Get Their Day in
Court, Associated Press (Sept. 20, 1987), https://www.apnews.com/8ea94c1c992fd97e7eea7fe72a
924f73); see also In re Estate of Schooler, 204 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining
how a guardian removed a ward from her current care facility, stating he was taking her to lunch but
instead relocated her to a new facility two hours away).
137
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interest at stake during guardianship proceedings includes property interests,
liberty interests, and other fundamental rights, all of which are of vital importance
and all of which should require a higher degree of protection before they are taken
away from any individual.138

2. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation through the Procedures Used
The second prong of the Eldridge balancing test is “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards . . . .”139 This prong
measures the likelihood of an erroneous guardianship appointment and how
detrimental such an appointment would be to the ward.140 Wyoming’s current
guardianship statute requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.141 The
purpose of the standard of proof is to instruct the factfinder of the “degree of
confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.”142 The standard of proof also
allocates risk of error for the particular type of hearing at issue.143 To satisfy due
process requirements, the standard of proof must reflect the societal value of the
individual right of which the ward is deprived.144 The court may require a higher
standard of proof if “the challenged standard of proof does not comport with the
minimum requirements of due process.”145 In order to compensate for the high
risk of error and the detrimental consequences stemming from a guardianship,
Wyoming should require at least the heightened standard of clear and convincing
evidence for guardianship proceedings.146

138

See supra notes 122–37 and accompanying text.

139

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

See Chemerinsky, supra note 82, at 606; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343 (“An additional factor
to be considered here is the fairness and reliability of the existing pretermination procedures . . . .”);
see also Haines & Campbell, supra note 2, at 15.
140

141

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-104 (2019).

Davis v. State, 2018 WY 40, ¶ 46, 415 P.3d 666, 681–82 (2018) (citing Cooper v.
Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 362 (1996)).
142

143
J.J.F. v. State, 2006 WY 41, ¶ 15, 132 P.3d 170, 176 (2006); Josephine Fiore, Constitutional
Law: Burden of Proof—Clear and Convincing Evidence Required to Terminate Parental Rights, 22
Washburn L.J. 140, 148 (1982); Barbara S. Shulman, Fourteenth Amendment—The Supreme
Court’s Mandate for Proof Beyond a Preponderance of the Evidence in Terminating Parental Rights, 73
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1595, 1599– 601 (1982).

Fiore, supra note 143, at 143; see also J.J.F., 132 P.3d at 175 (citing Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S 418, 423 (1979)).
144

145

Shulman, supra note 143, at 1601.

146

See infra notes 147–82 and accompanying text.
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a. Due to the Risk of Error Involved, the Preponderance of the
Evidence Standard is Not Appropriate in Guardianship Proceedings
The preponderance of the evidence standard is defined as “proof which leads
the trier of fact to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable
than its non-existence.”147 This standard is most appropriate when civil litigants
share the risk of error equally.148 The risk of error is considered equal when “it is
viewed as being no more serious for there to be an error in the plaintiff ’s favor than
for there to be an error in favor of the defendant.”149 In guardianship proceedings,
the risk of error is not equal, making a preponderance of the evidence standard
inappropriate in this context.150
In a guardianship proceeding, the balanced errors are the proposed ward’s
risk of an erroneous appointment of guardianship versus the petitioner’s risk
of an erroneous rejection of guardianship.151 A false positive in a guardianship
proceeding results when the court erroneously appoints a guardian.152 A false
positive carries substantial ramifications, such as the deprivation of the ward’s
liberty and property interests, the loss of fundamental rights, and placing the
ward in a position susceptible to abuse.153 Indeed, “[g]uardianship . . . has been
said to ‘unperson’ individuals.”154 The guardian has control of the ward’s finances
and personal property.155 Money and property paid or delivered to the ward may
be received and used by the guardian for the ward’s current needs, including
care and education.156 The court grants the guardian complete control of the
ward’s education and social activities, and may even allow the guardian to make
critical decisions regarding the ward’s medical or other professional care.157 With
the court’s approval, the guardian can gain more substantial power, such as the

J.J.F., 132 P.3d at 174 (citing Thornberg v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. Div. (In re
Thornberg), 913 P.2d 863, 866 (Wyo. 1996)).
147

Id. at 176 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982); Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d
931, 942 (Wyo. 2000) (internal cites omitted)).
148

149

Fiore, supra note 143, at 144.

150

See infra notes 151–82 and accompanying text.

151

See infra notes 153–59 and accompanying text.

152

See infra notes 153–59 and accompanying text.

153

See supra notes 122–38 and accompanying text; infra notes 160–66 and accompanying text.

154

Wood et al., supra note 1, at 20 (citing Bayles, supra note 137).

See supra notes 98 –104 and accompanying text; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-201(iv) (2019).
However, this control is not to be confused with the control of a conservator. Id. § 3-1-101(iii). The
conservator is in charge of the ward’s property, while the guardian is in control of the ward’s person.
Id. The guardian and the conservator can be the same person and can be appointed in the same
proceeding. Id. § 3-1-105.
155

156

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-201.

157

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §3-2-201(ii)–(iii).
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authority to commit the ward to a mental health hospital or to consent to certain
treatments, such as electroshock therapy or sterilization.158 Thus, a false positive
poses a major risk of error with the loss of these rights.159
Another risk of error implicated by a false positive is the placement of a
guardian in an authoritative position where she can abuse her power or take
advantage of the ward.160 Abuse of the guardianship position may come in
multiple forms, from stealing money or property to overcharging for guardianship
fees.161 Many states, including Wyoming, have enacted statutes addressing
complaints against guardians in order to provide wards with adequate redress in
instances of guardian abuse.162 For example, in New York, the court in In re Joshua
H. found that the guardian had improperly taken funds out of a trust account to
compensate herself.163 Another New York court removed a co-guardian in the case
of In re Francis M. due to the co-guardian treating the ward in a demeaning and
condescending way.164 In Missouri, a court removed a guardian after finding the
guardian had not acted in the ward’s best interest by moving her to another city
without discussing the move with her doctors or the court.165 The proposed ward’s
risks of being erroneously deprived of fundamental rights and being placed in a
position that makes her more susceptible to guardian abuse are considerable risks
of error implicated by an erroneous appointment.166
Conversely, a false negative in a guardianship proceeding results in the
court failing to appoint a guardian when one is needed.167 This error deprives
an individual of the care she needs when the individual is a threat to herself
due to the loss of capacity.168 Although a false negative is a costly error because

158

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-202(i)–(ii).

159

See supra notes 151–58 and accompanying text.

160

See infra notes 161– 66 and accompanying text.

KTNV Staff, The Guardian is Guilty: April Parks, Others Plead Guilty in Guardianship
Abuse Case (Nov. 15, 2018), KTNV Las Vegas, https://www.ktnv.com/news/contact-13/aprilparks-others-plead-guilty-in-guardianship-exploitation-case. In Nevada, four individuals, including
a guardian, her two business partners, and an attorney who represented her in guardianship cases,
collectively committed forty-two counts of theft and thirty-seven counts of exploitation during a
span of nearly five years. Id. These charges were supported by multiple billing scams and charges
for unneeded services. Id. The guardian was also accused of overmedicating and isolating the wards
in her care. Id. It was the largest guardianship abuse case to take place in the state. Id.; Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 3-2-104 (2019) (proceedings against persons suspected of concealing ward’s property).
161

162

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-111.

163

In re Joshua H., 62 A.D.3d 795, 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).

164

In re Francis M., 58 A.D.3d 937, 939 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).

165

In re Estate of Schooler, 204 S.W.3d 338, 344–45 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).

166

See supra notes 160 – 65 and accompanying text.

167

See infra notes 168 –72 and accompanying text.

168

Dalton et al., supra note 29, § 34:10.
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guardianship provides protection for incompetent individuals, other alternatives
to guardianships exist, such as supported decision-making.169 Supported decisionmaking also provides protection to incompetent individuals in need.170 Therefore,
the risks are not equal because the detrimental consequences of a false positive
outweigh the consequences of a false negative.171 Thus, the preponderance of the
evidence standard is not appropriate in guardianship proceedings.172
The preponderance of the evidence standard is improper for guardianship
proceedings because it “tolerates a substantially higher error rate.”173 Under this
standard, the trier of fact should look to the persuasiveness of the evidence, not
the quantity of the evidence.174 However, the standard is often confused, and
the factfinder may simply consider the quantity.175 Under the preponderance
of the evidence standard, the fact-finder can often be indifferent about the
outcome, again leading to a higher risk of error.176 A proceeding with significant
repercussions such as the loss of fundamental rights should not employ a standard
that may result in such a high risk of error.177
Applying the preponderance of the evidence standard would mean an
erroneous appointment of guardianship is just as costly of an error as an erroneous
rejection of guardianship; however, this is not true.178 When balancing these errors,
a false positive finding that the proposed ward should be appointed a guardian

169
Kristen Booth Glen, What Judges Need to Know about Supported Decision-Making, and
Why, 58 Judges J. 26, 27 (2019) (“Supported decision-making simply reflects that persons with a
variety of intellectual, developmental, or cognitive disabilities also may need supports [in making a
decision, including] . . . gathering relevant information, explaining that information in simplified
language, weighing the pros and cons of a decision, considering the consequences of making—or
not making—a particular decision, communicating the decision to third parties, and assisting the
person with a disability to implement the decision.”).
170

See id. at 27–28.

171

See supra notes 151–70 and accompanying text.

172

See supra notes 167–71 and accompanying text.

Christoph Engel, Preponderance of the Evidence Versus Intime Conviction: A Behavior
Perspective on a Conflict Between American and Continental European Law, 33 Vt. L. Rev. 435, 444
(2009) (citing James Brook, Inevitable Errors: The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in Civil
Litigation, 18 Tulsa L.J. 79, 85 (1982)).
173

174

Fiore, supra note 143, at 144; Brook, supra note 173, at 81.

See Shulman, supra note 143, at 1599; Brook, supra note 173, at 81 (“The standard is not
construed to mean more evidence in a strictly quantitative sense as in the volume of evidence or the
number of witnesses who have appeared. Rather, the amount of evidence is a qualitative standard,
weighed in terms of its ability to convince. The standard is translated into a requirement that, based
on the totality of evidence produced, it appears that X is more likely to be true than false.”).
175

176

Engel, supra note 173, at 437–39.

Chemerinsky, supra note 82, at 592–632 (discussing the appropriate standard in other
proceedings involving fundamental rights).
177

178

See supra notes 147–71 and accompanying text.
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is much more serious than a false negative.179 A false positive appointment
erroneously carries dire consequences because it deprives the ward of many of her
most fundamental rights as determined by our Founding Fathers and the Supreme
Court of the United States.180 The erroneous appointment also deprives a ward
of liberty and property interests.181 Therefore, the current Wyoming guardianship
statute’s evidentiary standard leads to a high risk of error in a proceeding that
involves detrimental ramifications, indicating that the standard is inappropriate.182

b. Proceedings Depriving Individuals of Fundamental Rights or
Important Individual Interests Require the Clear and Convincing
Evidence Standard
Wyoming courts that have applied the Eldridge balancing test in cases
involving the deprivation of an individual’s fundamental rights required a clear and
convincing evidence standard of proof.183 As previously noted, the preponderance
of the evidence standard applies when the risk of error on both sides is deemed
equal.184 When the individual interest is “both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more
substantial than a mere loss of money,’” the court requires a clear and convincing
evidence standard.185 The deprivation of fundamental rights satisfies the clear and
convincing evidence requirement; fundamental rights are more substantial than a
mere loss of money and are important.186
The Wyoming Supreme Court requires a clear and convincing evidence
standard of proof in a wide variety of proceedings, including revocation of
professional licenses.187 Revocation proceedings involve an individual’s right to
earn a living, and can deprive an individual of her property interest in a professional
license.188 In Painter v. Abels, the court found that the deprivation of a professional
license was more than a mere loss of money.189 After balancing all three factors of
179

See supra notes 151–77 and accompanying text.

180

See supra notes 122–38 and accompanying text.

181

See supra notes 94–113 and accompanying text.

182

See supra notes 178– 81 and accompanying text.

Cf. State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Robbins, 2011 WY 23, ¶ 18–19, 246 P.3d 864,
867 (2011).
183

184
J.J.F. v. State, 2006 WY 41, ¶ 15, 132 P.3d 170, 176 (2006); see also infra note 148 and
accompanying text.
185

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982).

186

See supra notes 122–38, 185 and accompanying text.

187

Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 939 (Wyo. 2000).

188

Id. at 940.

Id. at 941 (“Potential loss of a license is ‘more substantial than mere loss of money and
some jurisdictions reduce the risk to the defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously
by increasing the plaintiff ’s burden of proof.’” (quoting Johnson v. Bd. of Governors of Registered
Dentists of Okla., 913 P.2d 1339, 1345 (Okla. 1996))).
189
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the Eldridge test, the court held the preponderance of the evidence standard did
not adequately protect the individual’s interests, and that the State was required to
prove its professional revocation cases by clear and convincing evidence instead.190
Even though the court held that clear and convincing evidence was required,
certain professionals may have their license revoked based on the finding that
the professional is mentally incompetent.191 If the court appoints a guardian in
a proceeding involving an individual with a professional license, the court may
adjudicate a professional mentally incompetent by only a preponderance of
the evidence.192 Therefore, through a guardianship proceeding in Wyoming, a
professional may have her license revoked under a lower standard than the required
clear and convincing evidence.193 If the Wyoming Supreme Court requires the
clear and convincing evidence standard for a proceeding that only takes away an
individual’s right to earn a living, the court should also require it in guardianship
proceedings, which involve not only the potential deprivation of the right to earn
a living, but many other fundamental rights.194
In State v. Robbins, the Wyoming Department of Transportation challenged
the district court’s holding requiring the clear and convincing evidence standard to
uphold a commercial driver’s license disqualification.195 The Wyoming Supreme
Court interpreted Wyoming Statute § 31-7-102(a)(xxv) to define a commercial
driver’s license as a privilege, not a fundamental right.196 The court also rejected the
argument that a commercial driver’s license was equal to a professional licensure
requiring the clear and convincing evidence standard.197 Since the commercial
driver’s license was a privilege instead of a fundamental right, the court reversed
the lower court’s holding and found that the preponderance of the evidence

190
Id. (“(1) The private interest in a professional license is substantial. In these administrative
proceedings, Dr. Painter faced the potential loss of: (a) a protected property right; (b) her livelihood;
and (c) her professional reputation. (2) The state’s interest in protecting the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens from a medical licensee’s incompetence or misconduct is legitimate and
substantial. (3) The risk of error is high in a proceeding seeking to revoke a medical license.”).
191
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-46-103 (2019) (midwifes); 19-9 Wyo. Code. R. § 7 (LexisNexis
2019) (teachers); 22-7 Wyo. Code. R. § 2 (LexisNexis 2019) (professionals involved with
respiratory care); 56-7 Wyo. Code. R. § 2 (LexisNexis 2019) (optometrists); 43-9 Wyo. Code. R.
§ 2 (LexisNexis 2019) (dietitians).
192

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-104.

193

Supra notes 191–92 and accompanying text.

194

Supra notes 183–93 and accompanying text.

195

State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Robbins, 2011 WY 23, ¶ 1, 246 P.3d 864, 864 (2011).

196

Id., ¶ 14, 246 P.3d at 866.

Id., ¶ 18, 246 P.3d at 867 (“Moreover, we note the distinct difference between a professional
license, such as a medical license and a driver’s license. One involves a fundamental right, and one
does not. A commercial driver’s license is a privilege and not a right, and thus does not rise to the
level necessitating a clear and convincing evidence burden of proof.”).
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standard was properly applied to disqualification proceedings.198 In Robbins,
the court discussed the differences between a “right” and a “privilege,” and held
that when only a privilege is at risk, preponderance of the evidence is the correct
standard.199 In contrast, when a right is at risk, the courts must use the clear and
convincing evidence standard.200 It follows, then, that since guardianship deprives
an individual of fundamental rights and not merely privileges, Wyoming should
require clear and convincing evidence as the standard of proof.201
The United States Supreme Court requires clear and convincing evidence
in situations where important individual interests are implicated in civil cases.202
These situations include the termination of parental rights, civil commitment,
and deportation.203 In Santosky v. Kramer, the Court held that the state must
prove its allegations by clear and convincing evidence before depriving parents of
their fundamental right to the care, custody, and management of their children.204
Similarly, in Addington v. Texas, the Court found that an individual in a civil
commitment proceeding has an important interest in not being involuntarily
confined.205 Thus, the Court required a finding by clear and convincing
evidence.206 Deportation proceedings involve individual interests such as familial,
economical, and societal ties to the United States.207 The Court found these
interests important and required the State to prove the necessity for deportation
by clear and convincing evidence.208 Proceedings that deprive an individual of
important interests or fundamental rights require a higher standard of proof,
implying that there is a high risk of error associated with the preponderance of
the evidence standard.209 Because guardianship proceedings similarly implicate
important individual interests and fundamental rights, the clear and convincing
evidence standard should be required.210

198

Id., ¶ 19, 246 P.3d at 867.

199

Id., ¶ 18, 246 P.3d at 867.

200

Id.

201

See supra notes 122–38, 183 –98 and accompanying text.

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768–70
(1982); Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966).
202

203
In re FM v. Laramie Cty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 2007 WY 128, ¶ 7, 163 P.3d 844, 847
(2007) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768–70 (1982)); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 424 (1979); Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966).

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768–70. The Wyoming Supreme Court noted this holding in FM,
163 P.3d at 847.
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Addington, 441 U.S. at 425.

206

Id. at 433.
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Woodby, 385 U.S. at 286.
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See supra notes 202– 08 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 98–109, 122–38 and accompanying text.
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In situations involving the ultimate deprivation of liberty—incarceration—
accused individuals receive the highest degree of protection: proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. In a congressional hearing nearly thirty years ago, it was
stated “‘[t]he typical ward has fewer rights than the typical felon.’”211 Criminal
law errs on the side of caution, as Benjamin Franklin once said, “‘it is better a
hundred guilty persons should escape than one innocent person should suffer.’”212
Wards lose substantial rights when placed in a guardianship.213 In guardianship
proceedings, the court should also err on the side of caution in order to protect the
“innocent”—those who do not truly need a guardian—by requiring the petitioner
to prove necessity and incompetence by clear and convincing evidence.214

c. The Weight of Authority Suggests the Preponderance of the
Evidence Standard Leads to a High Risk of Error in Guardian
ship Proceedings
Wyoming is the last state to require only a preponderance of the evidence
standard in guardianship proceedings.215 New Hampshire goes so far as to provide
proposed wards with the highest degree of protection, requiring incapacity
and necessity of guardianship to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.216
The National Probate Court Standards propose that, in order to ensure a ward
receives due process of law, guardianship appointments be based on clear and
convincing evidence.217
Further, Wyoming’s neighbor, Utah, faced this question in the case In re
Boyer.218 In Boyer, the Utah Supreme Court held that guardianship appointments
211
Wright, supra note 126, at 351 n.9 (“By appointing a guardian, the court entrusts to
someone else the power to choose where they will live, what medical treatment they will get and,
in rare cases, when they will die. It is, in one short sentence, the most punitive civil penalty that
can be levied against an American citizen, with the exception, of course, of the death penalty.”
(quoting Chairman of Subcomm. on Health & Long-Term Care of the H. Select Comm. on
Aging, 100th Cong., Abuses in Guardianship of the Elderly and Infirm: A National Disgrace
(Comm. Print 1987) (prepared statement of Chairman Claude Pepper))).

Doron Teichman, Convicting with Reasonable Doubt: An Evidentiary Theory of Criminal
Law, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 757, 758 (2017) (citing Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin
Vaughan (Mar. 14, 1785), in 11 The Works of Benjamin Franklin 13 (John Bigelow ed., 1904)).
212

213

See supra notes 122–38 and accompanying text.

214

See supra notes 6, 211–13 and accompanying text.

Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 5 (showing charts indicating seven states list no standard of
proof, one state requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and forty-one states require clear and
convincing evidence).
215

216

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 464-A:9 (2019).

Nat’l Prob. Ct. Standards § 3.3.9 cmt. (“The appointment of a guardian or conservator
should be based on clear and convincing evidence. . . . Evidentiary rules and requirements
are needed to ensure that due process is afforded and that competent evidence is used to
determine incapacity.”).
217

218

In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1091 (Utah 1981).
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for incompetent persons was unconstitutional under the evidentiary standard of
preponderance of the evidence.219 The court found that the preponderance of the
evidence standard did not adequately protect the proposed ward’s interests.220 In
support of this finding, the court stated that the “preponderance of the evidence
test allows for considerable doubt in the fact finder’s mind as to the correctness of
the judgment.”221 The court concluded by noting that the clear and convincing
evidence standard was “therefore necessary to minimize error in guardianship
cases to the extent possible without undermining or frustrating the important
purposes served by the guardianship statutes . . . .”222 Similarly, the Iowa Supreme
Court held that, “[b]ecause the liberty interest of the individual is at stake in civil
commitment and guardianship proceedings, we think the clear and convincing
evidence standard is the appropriate one to apply in guardianship proceedings,
whether those proceedings involve appointment, applications to modify, or
applications to terminate.”223
Almost thirty years ago, both Utah and Iowa resolved the constitutionally
required standard of proof issue and granted further protection for proposed
wards.224 Wyoming is the last state that requires only a preponderance of the
evidence in guardianship proceedings, and the weight of authority suggests the
preponderance of the evidence standard leads to a high risk of error.225 Therefore,
the Wyoming State Legislature or the Wyoming Supreme Court should provide
proposed wards with greater protection by requiring the necessity of the
guardianship and status of the ward in guardianship proceedings to be proven by
clear and convincing evidence.226

d. The Value of Requiring the Clear and Convincing
Evidence Standard
The clear and convincing evidence standard should be the standard of proof
required for Wyoming’s guardianship proceedings.227 The clear and convincing
evidence standard is the intermediate standard between preponderance of the
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.228 The Wyoming Supreme Court defined

219

Id.

220

Id.

221

Id.

222

Id. at 1091–92.

223

In re Hedin, 528 N.W.2d 567, 581 (Iowa 1995).

224

Id.; In re Boyer, 636 P.2d at 1091.

225

See supra notes 6, 215–24 and accompanying text.

226

See supra notes 215–25 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 228–37 and accompanying text.

228

J.J.F. v. State, 2006 WY 41, ¶ 13, 132 P.3d 170, 175 (2006).
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clear and convincing evidence as the “kind of proof which would persuade a trier
of fact that the truth of the contention is highly probable.”229 In Santosky, the
Court stated that clear and convincing evidence is required “when the individual
interests at stake in a state proceeding are both particularly important and more
substantial than mere loss of money.”230 Although the guardianship proceeding is
a civil proceeding, the ward’s interests far exceed a mere loss of money.231
As held by the Wyoming Supreme Court, the clear and convincing
evidence standard is required in cases involving fundamental rights.232 The
ward has substantial interests at stake in a guardianship proceeding, including
the possibility of losing fundamental rights.233 The second prong of the Eldridge
test dictates that if another standard “increases the accuracy of the factfinding” it
should be required.234 The preponderance of the evidence standard has a high risk
of error that the clear and convincing evidence standard could remedy, because
the clear and convincing evidence standard requires a higher degree of belief:
that “the contention is highly probable.”235 If the factfinder’s degree of the belief
is higher, the factfinder’s degree of confidence will also be higher, which then
reduces the risk of error for the proposed ward.236 Therefore, since guardianship
proceedings involve substantial deprivations, including the loss of fundamental
rights, and a higher standard would lead to more accurate appointments of
guardians, Wyoming should require the clear and convincing evidence standard
in guardianship proceedings.237

3. The State’s Interest
The third prong of the Eldridge test looks to the State’s interest.238 Under the
parens patriae doctrine, the State of Wyoming has an interest in protecting its
citizens, and one way the State provides this protection is through guardianship
proceedings.239 The State’s protection under its parens patriae power includes not

In re Adoption of AMP, 2012 WY 132, ¶ 11, 286 P.3d 746, 749 (2012); see also J.J.F., ¶
8–13, 132 P.3d at 174.
229

230

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (internal quotations omitted).

231

See supra notes 122–38 and accompanying text.

State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Robbins, 2011 WY 23, ¶ 18, 246 P.3d 864, 867 (2011); see
also supra notes 195–201 and accompanying text.
232

233

See supra notes 98–109, 122–38 and accompanying text.

234

Chemerinsky, supra note 82, at 606.

J.J.F. v. State, 2006 WY 41, ¶ 9, 132 P.3d 170, 174 (2006); see also supra notes 147–225
and accompanying text.
235

236

Fiore, supra note 143, at 145; Engel, supra note 173, at 457.

237

See supra notes 98 –109, 122–236 and accompanying text.

238

Chemerinsky, supra note 82, at 335.

239

See Haines & Campbell, supra note 2, at 15–16; Shulman, supra note 143, at 1600.
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only an individual’s physical health, but also her economic well-being.240 Parens
patriae, translated literally, means “father of the country.”241 The Supreme Court
has stated “the State has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae power in
providing care to the mentally-ill who are unable to care for themselves.”242
Although the parens patriae doctrine is a vital doctrine that assists those in need,
it should not be easily exercised with a low standard of proof in a proceeding
that implicates fundamental rights.243 Therefore, before Wyoming can exercise the
parens patriae doctrine in guardianship proceedings, a higher standard of proof
should be required.244

4. The Eldridge Test Demonstrates that Wyoming Statute § 3-2-104
is Unconstitutional
The evidentiary standard required by Wyoming Statute § 3-2-104 is
unconstitutional.245 This Comment applied the Eldridge test, weighing “the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; . . . the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value . . . of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and . . . the
Government’s interest.”246 The first prong of the Eldridge test, the importance of
the interest to the individual, shows that the rights taken by the court appointing
a guardian are of vital importance, as the ward is deprived of fundamental rights,
thus requiring a higher degree of protection.247 There is a high risk of erroneous
guardianship due to the preponderance of evidence standard.248 The weight of
authority shows that the clear and convincing evidence standard reduces the risk
of error and adequately protects proposed wards.249 Before exercising the parens
patriae doctrine, the State should raise the burden of proof in guardianship
proceedings to at least the clear and convincing evidence standard.250 All three

240

Ratliff, supra note 12, at 1853.

Michael Malina & Michael D. Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages under the
Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U. L. Rev. 193, 197 (1970).
241

242
Donald Stone, There Are Cracks in the Civil Commitment Process: A Practitioner’s Recom
mendations to Patch the System, 43 Fordham Urb. L.J. 789, 792 (2016) (citing Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979)).
243

See Wood et al., supra note 1, at 6; supra notes 122–38 and accompanying text.

244

See supra notes 239– 43 and accompanying text.

245

See supra notes 76–246 and accompanying text.
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Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 355 (1976).
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See supra notes 122–38 and accompanying text.
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prongs weighed under the Eldridge test demonstrate that Wyoming Statute § 3-2104 is unconstitutional because the preponderance of the evidence standard is
inadequate to protect the rights implicated by the appointment of a guardian.251
Therefore, either the Wyoming Supreme Court should find this statute
unconstitutional, or the Wyoming State Legislature should revise the statute to
require the clear and convincing evidence standard.252

IV. Conclusion
In some situations, a guardianship can result with the ward living as a
prisoner in her own life, because she is deprived of many fundamental rights
similar to those who are incarcerated.253 Yet, in Wyoming, the standard of proof
in guardianship proceedings is only a preponderance of the evidence.254 This
evidentiary standard does not adequately protect the fundamental rights of
individuals and, thus, the statute is unconstitutional.255 In order to protect its
citizens and their fundamental rights, Wyoming should require at least the clear
and convincing evidence standard in guardianship proceedings.256
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